Herat, Afghanistan - out of the scene at Abbottabad, Pakistan, one of the stars of the global bombing, some people wonder about the returns to Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader who, like Osama bin Laden, has made a virtue of necessity: to transform the lam, and hence the impossibility of exposing himself in public, strategy 'political and media'.
Rare appearances (if not the most faithful), speeches spirits with extreme caution any statement issued intermittently by the Council leaders, the political body of the Taliban leadership, which seems to have Omar still the biggest influence. The latest was announced four days ago on the ability of the propaganda office turbans blacks, and announced a new military offensive in the spring.
Among analysts in Kabul, says there are those who believe that the official statements of the Koranic students are directly attributable to Mullah Omar, and that any major military operation in the land of the Pashtuns should go for its prior approval. Not everyone thinks so, though: Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn two researchers based in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, creators of a successful book biography about the life of Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, ambassador to Pakistan on behalf of Taliban and now, after some years in prison in Guantanamo, figure 'mediator' between anti-government movements and the Afghan government headed by Hamid Karzai.
Their last book, just published - We Created An Enemy: The Myth of the Taliban / Al Qaeda in Afghanistan Merger, 1970-2010 (Hurst) - the two researchers dispute the view of the alleged alliance Taleb-al Qaeda, and argue that Mullah Omar has been only symbolic power, as a religious leader, but no primary role as military leader.
Among the causes of their marginalization, the strategies adopted by NATO and the United States: Campaigns targeted killing of insurgent leaders, along with the arrest in early 2010 in Pakistan and elsewhere of a large number of prominent representatives of Council of the Taliban, would "weaken the whole structure of command and the leadership's ability to enforce decisions." From here, a rift between the old guard Taliban (including Mullah Omar), who would be willing to dialogue negotiating with the Kabul government, and the new generation, closer to the Al Qaeda-inspired jihadists and somewhat reluctant to compromise with any hypothesis Western invaders.
For Antonio Giustozzi, among the most authoritative experts of Afghanistan - which has devoted important books like the Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Columbia University Press, 2006) - "Mullah Omar is not very active. Sometimes it is several months without being alive, even with his staff, then spread some decree or decision binding.
" Giustozzi but believes that it is a real strategy of "European monarch:" The trick - he explained recently in Kabul - is not to take too much responsibility, because it takes more and more likely to burn your hands. Spoke only on important matters, where it was necessary to his authority by delegating the management of daily affairs in the various councils.
It may not be in great shape but is adopting a conscious strategy: to limit its functions to those of a President of the Republic of German type. Suits him because it must still remain in hiding, and it would be difficult and dangerous to directly manage the movement. " Even more uncertain, the place from which it operates: the majority of analysts tend to think that, with the most important Taliban leader, is in Quetta, Pakistan.
And in the last three years has tried to distance itself from the suffocating embrace of the Pakistani secret service, the ISI, but did not succeed completely. For the Pakistanis yet comfortable - say evil - shake his ghost. Except then risk being burned, as happened with Bin Laden. Giuliano Battiston - Letter 22 
Rare appearances (if not the most faithful), speeches spirits with extreme caution any statement issued intermittently by the Council leaders, the political body of the Taliban leadership, which seems to have Omar still the biggest influence. The latest was announced four days ago on the ability of the propaganda office turbans blacks, and announced a new military offensive in the spring.
Among analysts in Kabul, says there are those who believe that the official statements of the Koranic students are directly attributable to Mullah Omar, and that any major military operation in the land of the Pashtuns should go for its prior approval. Not everyone thinks so, though: Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn two researchers based in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, creators of a successful book biography about the life of Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, ambassador to Pakistan on behalf of Taliban and now, after some years in prison in Guantanamo, figure 'mediator' between anti-government movements and the Afghan government headed by Hamid Karzai.
Their last book, just published - We Created An Enemy: The Myth of the Taliban / Al Qaeda in Afghanistan Merger, 1970-2010 (Hurst) - the two researchers dispute the view of the alleged alliance Taleb-al Qaeda, and argue that Mullah Omar has been only symbolic power, as a religious leader, but no primary role as military leader.
Among the causes of their marginalization, the strategies adopted by NATO and the United States: Campaigns targeted killing of insurgent leaders, along with the arrest in early 2010 in Pakistan and elsewhere of a large number of prominent representatives of Council of the Taliban, would "weaken the whole structure of command and the leadership's ability to enforce decisions." From here, a rift between the old guard Taliban (including Mullah Omar), who would be willing to dialogue negotiating with the Kabul government, and the new generation, closer to the Al Qaeda-inspired jihadists and somewhat reluctant to compromise with any hypothesis Western invaders.
For Antonio Giustozzi, among the most authoritative experts of Afghanistan - which has devoted important books like the Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Columbia University Press, 2006) - "Mullah Omar is not very active. Sometimes it is several months without being alive, even with his staff, then spread some decree or decision binding.
" Giustozzi but believes that it is a real strategy of "European monarch:" The trick - he explained recently in Kabul - is not to take too much responsibility, because it takes more and more likely to burn your hands. Spoke only on important matters, where it was necessary to his authority by delegating the management of daily affairs in the various councils.
It may not be in great shape but is adopting a conscious strategy: to limit its functions to those of a President of the Republic of German type. Suits him because it must still remain in hiding, and it would be difficult and dangerous to directly manage the movement. " Even more uncertain, the place from which it operates: the majority of analysts tend to think that, with the most important Taliban leader, is in Quetta, Pakistan.
And in the last three years has tried to distance itself from the suffocating embrace of the Pakistani secret service, the ISI, but did not succeed completely. For the Pakistanis yet comfortable - say evil - shake his ghost. Except then risk being burned, as happened with Bin Laden. Giuliano Battiston - Letter 22
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