Monday, May 2, 2011

Bin Laden, the story of the hunt for "The Big Catch" the big fish

We publish "The circle narrows," a chapter from the book by Leo Sisti "The Hunt for Bin Laden" (Baldini Castoldi Dalai Editore, 2004). Here is the audio commentary Sisti capture. The killing of Osama Bin Laden, the analysis by Leo Sisti ilfattoquotidiano. it "At Langley, the CIA headquarters, in the jargon they call it 'The Big Catch', the large prey.

The 'Farm', the farm, as he was nicknamed the headquarters of the spies, the prey is Osama Bin Laden. Not since 2001, but at least five years before. In the spring of 2004 it seems that the capture of rich Saudi terrorist is a done deal. Especially in March, when the journalists of The New York Times and Washington Post report that Bin Laden has been sighted in the mountains of Waziristan, the tribal areas of Pakistan, which is near the day of reckoning for his deputy, the Egyptian doctor Ayman Zawahiri.

They are wrong. For now nothing 'Big Catch': it will be for another time. The story of the hunt for Osama Bin Laden is dotted with many episodes and a dismal failure. Shows that the Americans put a lot 'to figure out who is Bin Laden. Lightweight and underestimation led to the failure that an attempt could be decisive.

It is the Washington Post reporter Steve Coll to unveil the first in the book 'Ghost Wars' behind the scenes of a fiasco that saw the dock former President Bill Clinton, attacked the CIA for his indecision. The 'Bin Laden issue unit', the Bin Laden unit, was created in early 1996, when the 'sheikh of terror' is already under surveillance in Sudan, where he keeps an eye Cofer Black, seconded by Khartoum in its Farm for this.

Then the U.S. embassy there is closed for security reasons. And we started from scratch, because Bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in the spring of '96, he took refuge in Afghanistan. Hence, we are in '97 and resumed his campaign against the Americans: fax, television interviews, pamphlet.

Suddenly the Bin Laden unit rises. At Langley, we would like to make use of agents to be deployed in Afghanistan, using a network already set up earlier in another case. Code name of this team, all Afghans, placed in Kandahar: Fd / Trodpint. Task: collect information on bin Laden and send the memorandum to him in the United States.

From a simple monitoring of the situation but soon pass into another phase. Clinton approves the project, take Osama Bin Laden, in America and transfer it to trial. From now on, we are at the end of '97, comes alive in the new plan of the CIA. Coll writes: 'The hunt for Osama Bin Laden had formally begun: it will be long and frustrating'.

Yes, because in some instances the proposals made do not make big steps forward: sometimes rejected by leaders of Langley, and sometimes Clinton's advisers, 'super conservative, obsessed with the legal aspects of the operation and to take political risks against in Afghanistan where he was arming the enemies of Bin Laden and the Afghan conflict with the Taliban '.

In early '98 the grand jury in New York opened a secret investigation by the Financial Bin Laden offering a legal foothold in the movement. According to executive order number 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, and confirmed by his successors, you can now seize those responsible for crimes in America and drag it to court.

Take a new password. Bin Laden may be kidnapped, but must be captured alive according to Executive Order 12333, the murder by the CIA is prohibited. All that remains is to proceed, giving the green light to the people of Trodpint. The idea is to keep segregated Bin Laden in a cave in Afghanistan for thirty days until they reach the American special forces to move to the USA.

In the spring of 1998, a stroke of luck seems to be favorable to the CIA. Bin Laden, talking on his satellite phone with one of his wives, is found in a location five kilometers from Kandahar. The compound of Tarnak, the name, is photographed from satellites. Only women and children who live there.

And if we run away during the attack deaths and injuries among civilians? Serious trouble. Richard Clarke, the coordinator of counterterrorism at Bill Clinton, discusses in Langley. The White House became skeptical too many unknowns. In the case of the massacre there should be half of the relations with the Muslim world.

In June 1998 the details of the raid are reviewed. But in the high ranks of the CIA and the White House skepticism reigns. Those who developed the blitz on Tarnak moans and presses for a breakthrough. But on Aug. 7, two months after that meeting, the crime happens. Two groups of Al Qaeda attack simultaneously to the sound of bombs the U.S.

embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam causing 224 deaths and hundreds injured. Bin Laden unit of the CIA analyst, a woman, crying faces its director George Tenet and accuses him: 'You are responsible for those deaths because he did not act on the basis of the information we had: we could grab'.

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