Marc Valeri, who teaches political economy of the Middle East at the University of Exeter (Great Britain), is the author of The Sultanate of Oman: a revolution in trompe-l'oeil, published in 2007 Paperback editions. It discusses the causes of the tensions besetting the countries of the Arabian peninsula, at a time when protesters blocked the port of the industrial city of Sohar.
One can certainly speak of authoritarian rule. This is certainly the most centralized regime in the region: in other Gulf monarchies, the royal family concentrated powers, while in Oman, everything is in the hands of the sultan. Qaboos is both prime minister, army chief, central bank governor and minister of defense.
It controls all the important posts of the country. Qaboos has indeed arrived at the head of Oman in 1970 by overthrowing his father, assisted by British advisers. This coincides with the start of oil extraction in this country, which started in 1967. In the collective imagination, his accession to power corresponds to the arrival of oil.
This item has enormous service to establish its legitimacy. The reforms implemented since his arrival are relative, however. It established in early 1980 an advisory council which has no legislative power. Similarly, political parties remain banned in the sultanate. So there was an opening, but is extremely weak politically.
For two years, some elites demanding change. Intellectuals, writers and some journalists are beginning to demand an institutional reform that would establish a parliament, which would have real legislative powers. But their message has only little resonance within the population. Therefore the challenge is primarily socio-economic but extends into the political field: in Oman are the same elites who control economic policy decisions, and that since the 1970s.
Protesters denounce this fact. Certainly not. The current challenges, although they take a turn violent, are not directly Qaboos. The protesters accuse him of having allowed too much latitude to some of his ministers and advisers, and his entourage. It was this circle that is mostly contested.
The fact that the Sultan himself escaped criticism explained by history. He came to power in 1970 in what was then one of the poorest countries in the world. In this territory the size of half of France, there were only six kilometers of paved roads, no real hospital structure, a very high rate of anemia, a life expectancy of 45 to 50 years.
In 40 years in power, Sultan Qaboos has succeeded in developing the country by redistributing oil income, while maintaining a highly centralized political power. It has established a system of health and education almost free. Omanis who have known the state of the country before coming to power, and have bathed in the atmosphere of development for years 1980 and 1990, do not even challenge the sultan.
Today, approximately 55% of the population of Oman is under 24 years: they did not know this period of development. Young Omani born under Qaboos are more educated than their parents and do not find work. They no longer believe in the official rhetoric, which they consider outdated. From this point of view, the situation inevitably recalls what happens in other Arab countries, where leaders rely on a historical legitimacy that is nothing for young people.
In a very pragmatic, they want work that neither the public nor the private sector can offer. On the one hand because the economy is not particularly dynamic, and partly because of the tremendous population growth: there is too much demand relative to supply. In my opinion, not yet. Unlike states such as Bahrain, Oman does not have an organized civil society.
There is no culture of political debate in the country. Moreover, the country remains rural, and the dispute only concerns for the moment that urban youth. I think the Sultan still has room to turn the tide in his favor. It can not only rely on his personal charisma and legitimacy, but on the support of the United States, Great Britain and the monarchies of the region, which does not let go soon.
Interview by Vincent Matalon 
One can certainly speak of authoritarian rule. This is certainly the most centralized regime in the region: in other Gulf monarchies, the royal family concentrated powers, while in Oman, everything is in the hands of the sultan. Qaboos is both prime minister, army chief, central bank governor and minister of defense.
It controls all the important posts of the country. Qaboos has indeed arrived at the head of Oman in 1970 by overthrowing his father, assisted by British advisers. This coincides with the start of oil extraction in this country, which started in 1967. In the collective imagination, his accession to power corresponds to the arrival of oil.
This item has enormous service to establish its legitimacy. The reforms implemented since his arrival are relative, however. It established in early 1980 an advisory council which has no legislative power. Similarly, political parties remain banned in the sultanate. So there was an opening, but is extremely weak politically.
For two years, some elites demanding change. Intellectuals, writers and some journalists are beginning to demand an institutional reform that would establish a parliament, which would have real legislative powers. But their message has only little resonance within the population. Therefore the challenge is primarily socio-economic but extends into the political field: in Oman are the same elites who control economic policy decisions, and that since the 1970s.
Protesters denounce this fact. Certainly not. The current challenges, although they take a turn violent, are not directly Qaboos. The protesters accuse him of having allowed too much latitude to some of his ministers and advisers, and his entourage. It was this circle that is mostly contested.
The fact that the Sultan himself escaped criticism explained by history. He came to power in 1970 in what was then one of the poorest countries in the world. In this territory the size of half of France, there were only six kilometers of paved roads, no real hospital structure, a very high rate of anemia, a life expectancy of 45 to 50 years.
In 40 years in power, Sultan Qaboos has succeeded in developing the country by redistributing oil income, while maintaining a highly centralized political power. It has established a system of health and education almost free. Omanis who have known the state of the country before coming to power, and have bathed in the atmosphere of development for years 1980 and 1990, do not even challenge the sultan.
Today, approximately 55% of the population of Oman is under 24 years: they did not know this period of development. Young Omani born under Qaboos are more educated than their parents and do not find work. They no longer believe in the official rhetoric, which they consider outdated. From this point of view, the situation inevitably recalls what happens in other Arab countries, where leaders rely on a historical legitimacy that is nothing for young people.
In a very pragmatic, they want work that neither the public nor the private sector can offer. On the one hand because the economy is not particularly dynamic, and partly because of the tremendous population growth: there is too much demand relative to supply. In my opinion, not yet. Unlike states such as Bahrain, Oman does not have an organized civil society.
There is no culture of political debate in the country. Moreover, the country remains rural, and the dispute only concerns for the moment that urban youth. I think the Sultan still has room to turn the tide in his favor. It can not only rely on his personal charisma and legitimacy, but on the support of the United States, Great Britain and the monarchies of the region, which does not let go soon.
Interview by Vincent Matalon
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