"In Libya there is a risk stalling. And then a stall comes only with the intervention by land. " E 'opinion of Franco Apicella, Italian Army General no longer in service. "Even if we now talk about no-fly zones or assistance to the population, the current one is already a war. Targeted neutralization of Gaddafi's air defenses, at first, and then the neutralization of its potential logistical conventional deployments of units on the ground ".
General, what are the most immediate difficulties caused by the coordination of operations, so to speak, headless? I do not see much difficulty in coordinating an immediate, but rather the continuation of military activities: the thing that you will encounter will most likely be a stalemate.
Gaddafi on the ground is still able to move, organize and resist. The insurgents have rather limited compared to the operational capabilities of the army. And the coalition forces, I think of the French in particular, should try to avoid collateral damage. The situation is most risky in terms of technical military is this, to stall, from which he never comes out until you go on the ground, but the UN Resolution 1973 forbids it.
You may get a new resolution? At the moment it seems unlikely to be launched more heavy than the current one, which already has passed barely. Russia and China are now well regret not having voted against it. Now there are three separate commands: the U.S., UK and France. Frattini says that if you do not go under the hat of NATO, we will create a separate command.
Beyond the political issues, from the standpoint of a purely military-technical co-ordination in some way there, because otherwise it would be possible to fly the planes. This coordination is achieved by force of circumstances, using the structures of the United States and NATO. I am speaking of AWACS aircraft that give an exact reproduction of what is on the ground, without which you do not go anywhere.
Then all distinctions remain about the intentions of each actor, with Italy and says he does not want to bomb, or France, which wants to conduct more vigorous action. But a formal coordination and unambiguous it will take as well? From the technical point of view is only that NATO and the U.S.
have the opportunity to lead such a complex action. Then there will be adjustments that will give political color of the hat to be put on the operation. The hypothesis of a NATO command but when it does not seem very practical, because the Alliance does not intend to expose themselves more than they already face in Afghanistan.
In short, a real quagmire? Rather than bog really talk about risk deadlock, from which it might be possible to go out with a serious political and diplomatic activities, despite the party, we know, is very ambiguous. It seems that Monday Gaddafi's proposal to have UN observers to monitor what actually happens in the cities.
You have to see what this offer is real, but it could be a start. These observers should be protected, even from the military point of view. Maybe in a manner similar to that in Kosovo, where at the end of '98 were sent to OSCE observers and behind them a force that was supposed to enter the country in case of danger.
Our government can say "Our planes do not euphonium? Each country decides on its own in this situation: If our government decides that our planes did not bomb, do not bombard them, unless in self-defense: If you see a Tornado radar that illuminates it and a rocket that is being launched, has a duty to defend themselves and then take action.
Italy is now restricted to a role less, but necessary: our F-16 by helping to maintain air supremacy, while the Tornado are used to monitor the air defenses of Gaddafi. We could really deny the allies the use of the bases? Italy maintains its sovereignty over the bases and in theory can say "we do not want more foreign air." But it seems unlikely from the political point of view.
The so-called collateral damage or civilian casualties, all those who say they want to avoid, are not inevitable? A continuation of the air campaign with the intensity of the first day something sooner or later, unfortunately happen. 
General, what are the most immediate difficulties caused by the coordination of operations, so to speak, headless? I do not see much difficulty in coordinating an immediate, but rather the continuation of military activities: the thing that you will encounter will most likely be a stalemate.
Gaddafi on the ground is still able to move, organize and resist. The insurgents have rather limited compared to the operational capabilities of the army. And the coalition forces, I think of the French in particular, should try to avoid collateral damage. The situation is most risky in terms of technical military is this, to stall, from which he never comes out until you go on the ground, but the UN Resolution 1973 forbids it.
You may get a new resolution? At the moment it seems unlikely to be launched more heavy than the current one, which already has passed barely. Russia and China are now well regret not having voted against it. Now there are three separate commands: the U.S., UK and France. Frattini says that if you do not go under the hat of NATO, we will create a separate command.
Beyond the political issues, from the standpoint of a purely military-technical co-ordination in some way there, because otherwise it would be possible to fly the planes. This coordination is achieved by force of circumstances, using the structures of the United States and NATO. I am speaking of AWACS aircraft that give an exact reproduction of what is on the ground, without which you do not go anywhere.
Then all distinctions remain about the intentions of each actor, with Italy and says he does not want to bomb, or France, which wants to conduct more vigorous action. But a formal coordination and unambiguous it will take as well? From the technical point of view is only that NATO and the U.S.
have the opportunity to lead such a complex action. Then there will be adjustments that will give political color of the hat to be put on the operation. The hypothesis of a NATO command but when it does not seem very practical, because the Alliance does not intend to expose themselves more than they already face in Afghanistan.
In short, a real quagmire? Rather than bog really talk about risk deadlock, from which it might be possible to go out with a serious political and diplomatic activities, despite the party, we know, is very ambiguous. It seems that Monday Gaddafi's proposal to have UN observers to monitor what actually happens in the cities.
You have to see what this offer is real, but it could be a start. These observers should be protected, even from the military point of view. Maybe in a manner similar to that in Kosovo, where at the end of '98 were sent to OSCE observers and behind them a force that was supposed to enter the country in case of danger.
Our government can say "Our planes do not euphonium? Each country decides on its own in this situation: If our government decides that our planes did not bomb, do not bombard them, unless in self-defense: If you see a Tornado radar that illuminates it and a rocket that is being launched, has a duty to defend themselves and then take action.
Italy is now restricted to a role less, but necessary: our F-16 by helping to maintain air supremacy, while the Tornado are used to monitor the air defenses of Gaddafi. We could really deny the allies the use of the bases? Italy maintains its sovereignty over the bases and in theory can say "we do not want more foreign air." But it seems unlikely from the political point of view.
The so-called collateral damage or civilian casualties, all those who say they want to avoid, are not inevitable? A continuation of the air campaign with the intensity of the first day something sooner or later, unfortunately happen.
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