In fact, at that time, France had lost three points of support underpinning its major foreign policy since de Gaulle and led to the success of this: The first of these was undoubtedly the media European : the founder of the Fifth Republic was chosen because it get involved knew at the time that France was only able to shape and guide the diplomacy of the new Europe.
Despite some difficulties, France was able to conduct diplomacy and talk to the European enlargement on behalf of virtually all of its members. Enlargement has curbed that ability. The division that the Iraq issue had aroused in the EU has helped to paralyze the European diplomacy and thus indirectly weakened the capacity of France.
The second point of support is to be found in the backyard that General de Gaulle had made in Africa and had gradually expanded its Arab policy and its policy towards Latin America, generating favors from the South to the more tense moments of East-West bipolarity. This backyard Africa has defeated upon the failure of French Africa.
Arab policy has been compromised, particularly in a context of rapprochement between Paris and Tel Aviv and the South has fragmented as the old bipolarity disappeared. The third base was offered by multilateralism, ideal form of intervention for an average power, too weak to play alone, and too strong to disappear from the screens.
The blows dealt by the neoconservatives in the multilateral institutions have weakened them and actually reduces the flexibility of diplomatic France. It is clear in these circumstances it is not just a problem person, this slow degradation is not attributable to the holder of the authority, but a significant movement towards a less favorable environment.
Still, the arrival of a personality to the Quai d'Orsay weight should be interpreted as a way to regain the initiative, to revive a foreign policy, so all the more effective the new minister is deemed to be derived directly Gaullist family and thus enjoys an aura particularly favorable when it comes to foreign policy.
Gaffes accumulated for some time must of course be erased before a new format may seem credible diplomatic: this is probably the mission of Alain Juppe. First axis, we are in a context of globalization, whose main brand is no longer the military competition between states, but the enormity of the social contrasts that oppose the most developed part of the planet to the most poor.
It is in these contrasts that we find the primary source of major instability to come. Media-less visible, less embodied politically, this issue is nevertheless fundamental and must now serve as the basis for any foreign policy, particularly at the multilateral level. Alas, few initiatives in this area.
Second axis, in this globalization, the role of emerging markets is quite remarkable: although it is now more emphasized, it is not drawing the necessary consequences in terms of action. Major emerging countries, including Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa, are now essential hyphens between North and South, and as such become partners in a very rich and highly effective for the northern countries, helping them, but also possibly hindering, in their diplomatic efforts.
That priority should be to them to turn. Third line: globalization is not manageable without a revival of multilateralism: the overall plan, the neoconservatives have broken, at regional level, integration efforts were thwarted as a result of various factors. The rebirth of one and the other can not be urgent.
And certainly much more appropriate than this revival of a club that diplomacy needs dangerously contradicted inclusion of our global space. These three areas are not only priority, but should also lead us to transcend traditional views of competition made stato-national, military alliances, and too dated conceptions of national security.
There is today than human and global security. It will be very difficult in these circumstances to set policy goals ambitious, and very difficult to explain why NATO is acting here, not there, that is to say, Bahrain or Yemen not to mention Palestine. How in these conditions, to wonder at the discretion of decision makers on policy objectives? 
Despite some difficulties, France was able to conduct diplomacy and talk to the European enlargement on behalf of virtually all of its members. Enlargement has curbed that ability. The division that the Iraq issue had aroused in the EU has helped to paralyze the European diplomacy and thus indirectly weakened the capacity of France.
The second point of support is to be found in the backyard that General de Gaulle had made in Africa and had gradually expanded its Arab policy and its policy towards Latin America, generating favors from the South to the more tense moments of East-West bipolarity. This backyard Africa has defeated upon the failure of French Africa.
Arab policy has been compromised, particularly in a context of rapprochement between Paris and Tel Aviv and the South has fragmented as the old bipolarity disappeared. The third base was offered by multilateralism, ideal form of intervention for an average power, too weak to play alone, and too strong to disappear from the screens.
The blows dealt by the neoconservatives in the multilateral institutions have weakened them and actually reduces the flexibility of diplomatic France. It is clear in these circumstances it is not just a problem person, this slow degradation is not attributable to the holder of the authority, but a significant movement towards a less favorable environment.
Still, the arrival of a personality to the Quai d'Orsay weight should be interpreted as a way to regain the initiative, to revive a foreign policy, so all the more effective the new minister is deemed to be derived directly Gaullist family and thus enjoys an aura particularly favorable when it comes to foreign policy.
Gaffes accumulated for some time must of course be erased before a new format may seem credible diplomatic: this is probably the mission of Alain Juppe. First axis, we are in a context of globalization, whose main brand is no longer the military competition between states, but the enormity of the social contrasts that oppose the most developed part of the planet to the most poor.
It is in these contrasts that we find the primary source of major instability to come. Media-less visible, less embodied politically, this issue is nevertheless fundamental and must now serve as the basis for any foreign policy, particularly at the multilateral level. Alas, few initiatives in this area.
Second axis, in this globalization, the role of emerging markets is quite remarkable: although it is now more emphasized, it is not drawing the necessary consequences in terms of action. Major emerging countries, including Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa, are now essential hyphens between North and South, and as such become partners in a very rich and highly effective for the northern countries, helping them, but also possibly hindering, in their diplomatic efforts.
That priority should be to them to turn. Third line: globalization is not manageable without a revival of multilateralism: the overall plan, the neoconservatives have broken, at regional level, integration efforts were thwarted as a result of various factors. The rebirth of one and the other can not be urgent.
And certainly much more appropriate than this revival of a club that diplomacy needs dangerously contradicted inclusion of our global space. These three areas are not only priority, but should also lead us to transcend traditional views of competition made stato-national, military alliances, and too dated conceptions of national security.
There is today than human and global security. It will be very difficult in these circumstances to set policy goals ambitious, and very difficult to explain why NATO is acting here, not there, that is to say, Bahrain or Yemen not to mention Palestine. How in these conditions, to wonder at the discretion of decision makers on policy objectives?
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