Bahrain, a small archipelago in the Gulf Monday, February 14 has been experiencing a strong popular mobilization. Laurence Louër, a researcher at CERI (Centre for Studies and International Relations at Sciences Po), the overthrow of the regime seems "difficult" despite the existence of a strong opposition party.
It stresses "fairness" of the army, made up of "mercenaries" and "not compromise with the demonstrators." I do not know if we can speak of the uprising, to the extent that social movements are recurrent in Bahrain. Since the 1930s, the country is experiencing continuous mobilizations. The patterns and themes varied but there is a very constant: the importance of social issues and jobs.
In fact, Bahrain has always suffered from an endemic problem of unemployment. Already between 1994 and 1999 the country experienced an intifada. This movement is part of this continuity. The first is with the social issue of unemployment. The government says the unemployment rate is 3% or 4%, but experts agree that it is around 15-20% with a very large majority of young unemployed.
There is also the issue of low wages. Nearly 60% of the population works in the private sector. This sector is characterized by difficult working conditions and low wages. Protesters demand therefore a pay rise. Finally, the cost of living rises with inflation, let alone housing, and the fact that it takes 15 years for subsidized housing by the state.
It should be noted that the government tries to meet these demands. He implemented a major reform of the labor market since 2006. He introduced the taxation of labor of immigrant workers to a training fund for Bahraini professionals. Unique in the Gulf region: the government established an unemployment insurance scheme, which lasts six months.
Also started the overhaul of the pension system, a project of family allowance, the reform of the health system. These changes are in the air but it takes time and these reforms have not yet produced the effect that people had hoped. Protesters demand more. It is the second part. There are very strong in Bahrain sectarian tension: the Shiites feel they suffer most from poverty and discrimination in employment, especially government jobs that are better pay and provide benefits.
We can therefore speak of a Shiite mobilization: there are very few Sunnis among the demonstrators. The private sector, we find expatriates, fueling a sense of unfair competition within the population. Indeed, employers prefer foreign workers, who are considered more productive, which accept most difficult working conditions, lower wages and not politicized.
The opposition denounced the naturalization, for political purposes, foreign Sunni, the Sunni population to increase. In Bahrain, the estimated population is 70% Shiite. However, the ruling dynasty, the Khalifa, are Sunnis. They run the country since the late eighteenth century, when they forcibly imposed.
There is therefore a historical resentment towards them. In 1981, a Shiite Islamic party attempted a coup in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979, it has increased the sectarian polarization, with a wave of repression and rising tensions. The main players in the opposition then became the Shia Islamist movements.
They took over from the left parties and nationalist parties. This only increased tensions. This has also prevented the Sunnis identify with the goals of the opposition. The political aspect is the third part of the protest, with application to a democratic regime. But this demand is recurrent.
This time, more precisely, the protesters demand the restoration of 1973 constitution. Parliament then has a real legislative power. The intifada of 1994-1999 had been successfully placed the estate of the king by his eldest son and business modernization plan. But in 2002, the king unilaterally promulgated a new constitution that gives Parliament power less than 1973.
What I want the main opposition party, the Shiite Islamic party Al-Wefaq and all opposition movements organized, it is a constitutional monarchy. Al-Wafaqi may have to play an important role. It is the only political party across the Gulf, that is to say a modern party, organized with a very strong capacity to mobilize.
In this, the case of Bahrain is different from Tunisia and Egypt [where there was no organized opposition parties]. The role of this party will be even more important that he has announced his resignation from Parliament in protest. Previously, Al-Wefaq had attempted to cross the sectarian divide in alliance with a liberal Sunni party in parliament.
He participated in the elections of October 2010 and has worked to reform the labor market, the main sticking point being the sectarian discrimination. But faced with its base, Al-Wefaq can no longer play that role. The events mark the end of the institutionalized opposition. This is the most dangerous: if Al-Wefaq radicalized and plays the game of popular opposition, it can put the plan in a very difficult position.
In the police and army, there are very few and very few Bahraini Shiites. The security forces are composed of foreign mercenaries, all Sunnis. They come from Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan and even, say, Iraq. This expresses very well the distrust of the Shiite dynasty face: the armed forces serve to protect the regime against its own people.
Scenes of siding with the protesters, as in Tunisia and Egypt are not possible. These mercenaries are ultra-loyal and have no interest in sympathizing with the demonstrators. Hence the very strong repression. The police play its status with all its advantages: the overshooting from the first day due to the fact that it did not guilty conscience.
This lock is the first obstacle to mobilization. Unlike the case of Tunisia and Egypt, where the U.S. supported the change, it will be harder with Bahrain. Indeed, their Fifth Fleet is based in the country. Bahrain is also a key ally in their tense relations with Iran. The United States will think twice before then dropping a key ally.
In addition, Americans have a great mistrust vis-à-vis the Shiite opposition. Even if Al-Wefaq says he does not want an Islamic republic, there is a hint: if the Shiites take power, then they will be supported by Iran. This situation would be unacceptable to the United States but also for other Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.
The stakes for the EU europeennnes and France regarding Iran are identical. It should be remembered that there is a bridge between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, he is also a relationship of economic dependency. Finally, the kingdom is afraid that there is a contagion to his own Shiite population, which represents one third of residents in the Eastern Province, where its oil resources.
The stakes are even greater. If Bahrain has almost no oil, there is however a well in Saudi territorial waters, on which both countries share their sovereignty. Saudi Arabia operates and pays half of revenues, in theory, Bahrain. If the Saudis' close the tap, "this would cause a serious economic crisis in Bahrain.
This is a weapon that the Saudis could use. I think it is very difficult there is a regime change. There may be an uprising that lasts. It is conceivable that the king intends to get rid of the prime minister, in office since 1971 and hated by the population. One can also imagine a recomposition of government.
Finally, events may lead to concessions of the regime but not a reversal. Interview by Flora Knees 
It stresses "fairness" of the army, made up of "mercenaries" and "not compromise with the demonstrators." I do not know if we can speak of the uprising, to the extent that social movements are recurrent in Bahrain. Since the 1930s, the country is experiencing continuous mobilizations. The patterns and themes varied but there is a very constant: the importance of social issues and jobs.
In fact, Bahrain has always suffered from an endemic problem of unemployment. Already between 1994 and 1999 the country experienced an intifada. This movement is part of this continuity. The first is with the social issue of unemployment. The government says the unemployment rate is 3% or 4%, but experts agree that it is around 15-20% with a very large majority of young unemployed.
There is also the issue of low wages. Nearly 60% of the population works in the private sector. This sector is characterized by difficult working conditions and low wages. Protesters demand therefore a pay rise. Finally, the cost of living rises with inflation, let alone housing, and the fact that it takes 15 years for subsidized housing by the state.
It should be noted that the government tries to meet these demands. He implemented a major reform of the labor market since 2006. He introduced the taxation of labor of immigrant workers to a training fund for Bahraini professionals. Unique in the Gulf region: the government established an unemployment insurance scheme, which lasts six months.
Also started the overhaul of the pension system, a project of family allowance, the reform of the health system. These changes are in the air but it takes time and these reforms have not yet produced the effect that people had hoped. Protesters demand more. It is the second part. There are very strong in Bahrain sectarian tension: the Shiites feel they suffer most from poverty and discrimination in employment, especially government jobs that are better pay and provide benefits.
We can therefore speak of a Shiite mobilization: there are very few Sunnis among the demonstrators. The private sector, we find expatriates, fueling a sense of unfair competition within the population. Indeed, employers prefer foreign workers, who are considered more productive, which accept most difficult working conditions, lower wages and not politicized.
The opposition denounced the naturalization, for political purposes, foreign Sunni, the Sunni population to increase. In Bahrain, the estimated population is 70% Shiite. However, the ruling dynasty, the Khalifa, are Sunnis. They run the country since the late eighteenth century, when they forcibly imposed.
There is therefore a historical resentment towards them. In 1981, a Shiite Islamic party attempted a coup in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979, it has increased the sectarian polarization, with a wave of repression and rising tensions. The main players in the opposition then became the Shia Islamist movements.
They took over from the left parties and nationalist parties. This only increased tensions. This has also prevented the Sunnis identify with the goals of the opposition. The political aspect is the third part of the protest, with application to a democratic regime. But this demand is recurrent.
This time, more precisely, the protesters demand the restoration of 1973 constitution. Parliament then has a real legislative power. The intifada of 1994-1999 had been successfully placed the estate of the king by his eldest son and business modernization plan. But in 2002, the king unilaterally promulgated a new constitution that gives Parliament power less than 1973.
What I want the main opposition party, the Shiite Islamic party Al-Wefaq and all opposition movements organized, it is a constitutional monarchy. Al-Wafaqi may have to play an important role. It is the only political party across the Gulf, that is to say a modern party, organized with a very strong capacity to mobilize.
In this, the case of Bahrain is different from Tunisia and Egypt [where there was no organized opposition parties]. The role of this party will be even more important that he has announced his resignation from Parliament in protest. Previously, Al-Wefaq had attempted to cross the sectarian divide in alliance with a liberal Sunni party in parliament.
He participated in the elections of October 2010 and has worked to reform the labor market, the main sticking point being the sectarian discrimination. But faced with its base, Al-Wefaq can no longer play that role. The events mark the end of the institutionalized opposition. This is the most dangerous: if Al-Wefaq radicalized and plays the game of popular opposition, it can put the plan in a very difficult position.
In the police and army, there are very few and very few Bahraini Shiites. The security forces are composed of foreign mercenaries, all Sunnis. They come from Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan and even, say, Iraq. This expresses very well the distrust of the Shiite dynasty face: the armed forces serve to protect the regime against its own people.
Scenes of siding with the protesters, as in Tunisia and Egypt are not possible. These mercenaries are ultra-loyal and have no interest in sympathizing with the demonstrators. Hence the very strong repression. The police play its status with all its advantages: the overshooting from the first day due to the fact that it did not guilty conscience.
This lock is the first obstacle to mobilization. Unlike the case of Tunisia and Egypt, where the U.S. supported the change, it will be harder with Bahrain. Indeed, their Fifth Fleet is based in the country. Bahrain is also a key ally in their tense relations with Iran. The United States will think twice before then dropping a key ally.
In addition, Americans have a great mistrust vis-à-vis the Shiite opposition. Even if Al-Wefaq says he does not want an Islamic republic, there is a hint: if the Shiites take power, then they will be supported by Iran. This situation would be unacceptable to the United States but also for other Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.
The stakes for the EU europeennnes and France regarding Iran are identical. It should be remembered that there is a bridge between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, he is also a relationship of economic dependency. Finally, the kingdom is afraid that there is a contagion to his own Shiite population, which represents one third of residents in the Eastern Province, where its oil resources.
The stakes are even greater. If Bahrain has almost no oil, there is however a well in Saudi territorial waters, on which both countries share their sovereignty. Saudi Arabia operates and pays half of revenues, in theory, Bahrain. If the Saudis' close the tap, "this would cause a serious economic crisis in Bahrain.
This is a weapon that the Saudis could use. I think it is very difficult there is a regime change. There may be an uprising that lasts. It is conceivable that the king intends to get rid of the prime minister, in office since 1971 and hated by the population. One can also imagine a recomposition of government.
Finally, events may lead to concessions of the regime but not a reversal. Interview by Flora Knees
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