This means that such a system requires not only a high capacity of law enforcement, but also a strong ideology that removes any space of freedom and personal opinion, which is therefore unique as a mode of complete socialization of the individual. This vision corresponds historically to Nazism and Stalinism.
We were able to find hints with Maoism when the Cultural Revolution. It is found with the Khmer Rouge as installed in the second half of 1970. Maybe the totalitarianism he still corresponds to what is observed in North Korea. But even during the most severe of these various schemes are known to remain discreet and clandestine methods of individual autonomy that made that totalitarianism, fortunately, did not accomplished in his entire project.
Today, with globalization, the rise of communications technology, with the diversification of identifications and allegiances, totalitarianism is a political project increasingly less able to achieve. Moreover, few companies, particularly in the south, have the technical capabilities to sustain.
He should speak rather of authoritarianism, autocracy, and more exactly, to designate and regimes that are not freely chosen and which are constructed by restricting freedoms, restricting or denying the rights, and allowing the less autonomy possible civil societies. Precisely because of this project today is increasingly difficult to realize that we saw everywhere, and especially in these autocracies of the Arab world that are Tunisia Ben Ali of Egypt Mubarak and Gaddafi's Libya, a movement of emancipation from the company and its capabilities constantly strengthened empowerment.
The "protest zero" is not, fortunately, in all cases needed less and less. Even the harshest authoritarian regimes are forced to leak elements of dispute that can take unexpected forms, such as derision, misrepresentation, or happen in books other than those of classical politics, including through the directories religious.
Obviously, the optimum efficiency of authoritarian practice is to leave one part of a dispute to avoid risk of explosion. China is clearly entering a post-totalitarian moment. In any case, and most experts refer to the period starting after the Cultural Revolution, and in all cases, when the opening-up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
The choice that the post-Mao leaders have done for their country was that of entry into globalization. This meant to overcome the Maoist vision of a confrontation between China and global capitalism. Which also meant to integrate Chinese society and economic practices formerly vilified and denunciation which is built the totalitarian overtones of Maoist ideology.
Therefore, this change of path analysis and withdrew to China this ideology it needed to maintain a totalitarian order. Outright repression, the type of Tiananmen in June 1989, thus substituting for large buildings and previous switch was the Middle Kingdom in order autocratic trite, but now post-totalitarian.
Add to this that it is difficult to have your cake and eat it: the entry into globalization and maintaining order unanimist as the one who entrusted the Great Helmsman's conduct of his people. So basically in a volatile atmosphere, and which will increasingly, as China discovered empirically the benefits and dangers of post-totalitarianism.
Iran is a different case, since the ideology is an essential guard around Islam and an ideological reading of it. Add to this a range of symptoms that may support the idea of contention totalitarian control of consumption, dress, recreation, etc.. Yet here we are also out of pure totalitarian logic as we have defined.
First, because the Islamic Republic does not have the technical means for effective control and total company: it remains in Iran led by a series of autonomous dynamics that allow civil society to sustain and the challenge to express themselves through various channels. Moreover, the internationalization of fact of all societies prevents Iranian society to live outside the world and patterns of globalization.
We therefore speak of "religious autocracy" much more than a "religious totalitarianism." That is the problem. If today the Libyan autocracy is sinking, is largely because the centrifugal forces are deep and effective. It is therefore surprising that the revolution we see today can build a substitute regime collapses, one that would be just as central and could be likened to forms of state or democracy known in the West .
More profoundly, it is necessary to observe a major trend: the revolutions that have developed in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, but also being in Bahrain and Yemen, are above all social revolutions that mark the revenge of the companies much more than an opposition became non-existent or marginal.
We came suddenly in the post-Leninist, where protests are effective when they are not, to animate an organization, a leader, an ideology, a program. This post-Leninist logic fits well with globalization as we know it today, with the evolution of communications technology, with demographic changes, with conventional regression models ideological.
She invents a different political dynamic where the order is not prebuilt, but in a situation to build and evolve over the events. We can therefore expect, after a moment of strong centralization and idealization, a reinvention of another policy that will make it much more difficult the formation of a government model ordered.
That for better or for worse: the lack of organization and such post-Leninist revolutions may as well make the bed of a néobonapartisme, picking up any general power to take that promote invention new forms of participation, and perhaps eventually, new practices of democratic power. Do not forget, in fact, that those in power in Cairo and Tunis, perhaps tomorrow or in Tripoli in Manama, are and will be supervised by social actors, and even whole societies: their chance of retaining power will perhaps based on their abilities to listen to a society of which they now know it will never be silent.
It was stupidly bet on the silence of some companies, their indifference to democracy, the disorder of the elusive "Arab street": impressions of a racist nature are now forever denied. This is of course one of the unknowns. But we must be careful because too much has been simplified this aspect of reality is much more complex.
First, the army was not in power in Tunisia. There was a reign of police, and especially a policeman who had monopolized power. It does not say that the Tunisian army, which has undoubtedly contributed to the departure of Ben Ali, will be rewarded when it took power, or even that it seeks such an award.
In Egypt, however, the army was actually in power, and that since the coup of the Free Officers in 1952. She somehow defensible feeling at risk with power and corrupted spent as the Mubarak exercised, it has obviously sought to cut the dead branches. Is it so far today united as fifty years ago? It is here that we must be careful: I accept this way of speaking ill of the military in the singular, as could probably do it once.
Today in the army, have diversified interests, personalities have separated, ideologies were simultaneously eroded and broken. Arab nationalism in Nasser's version was a strong cement that gave meaning to the singular time of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Today, under the effect of erosion of pan-Arabism, but also because of globalization of which we spoke earlier, the army has lost the unity that once allowed to confuse in the same militant autocracy.
If we are to understand the future of Egypt, it would be much more appropriate to engage in a sociology of its divisions and its differentiations, without forgetting that one of its leaders may one day, on behalf charisma or simply skill, pick up power to his advantage. But it is hard to admit it will be a new Nasser, probably because, for the reasons stated above, the era of big mobilizations unanimist is probably outdated.
The Maghreb has never been a homogeneous space, and today less than ever. We easily assimilated than the case of Algeria from Tunisia. Now Algeria's just emerged from a long and costly civil war. In addition, she did not know the same freedoms that choking, Tunisia, was explosive and fatal to the despot.
No one can predict in the medium term, the evolution of social processes, but I do not think that Algeria is exposed to the same extent as its eastern neighbor, nor to that of countries like Yemen and Bahrain . Unlike in Tunisia, Algeria is truly power in confiscated by the army. Dispossession overall it is much less obvious to realize that the ouster of a dictator like Ben Ali.
From this point of view at least, it is closer to the case of Egypt and the ability of the Algerian army to Egypt as its big sister the work of regulation necessary to ensure its sustainability. In Morocco, the regulatory capacity is still owned by the monarchy, few challenged by social movements that develop there now.
Except acceleration of history, it seems unlikely that this screen gives legitimacy so easily. If one observes what is happening now, Syria appears to be one of the least affected in the Greater Middle East by the upheavals we have characterized. Several factors are taken into account. First, the Syrian regime has managed to preserve a minimum of national unity around a foreign policy that is very challenged and, unlike what happened in Egypt, ensures the sustainability of a minimum of national cohesion.
We see how Mubarak and his system took enormous risks by dismantling the Egyptian foreign policy and aligning it so cynical about the United States, and even the most radical governments of Israel. If the movement of Tahrir Square expressed no violence against Israel, the theme of solidarity with Palestine was everywhere and was an essential marker of the desire of young Egyptians out a humiliation to which had placed their country's diplomacy.
In addition, the regime of President Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar has no symptoms of corruption as shocking as those that accompany the family sagas Mubarak or Ben Ali's family. It seems to me that the Syrian regime is not in immediate danger, as most of its counterparts in the region.
The issue is complex and cumbersome, since you should first define what is meant by "real democracy". One thing is certain: the Western democratic model, which is that of representative government, is a story that is reducible neither to the long history of the Arab world, nor the data from its current situation.
Three fields must be thoroughly explored to characterize the future of this democracy. First, that of civil societies, still faintly identified, marked by fragile social contracts, and with autonomy still uncertain. Then, the institutions often artificial, clad, poorly understood and little valued by the population.
Finally, that of a chaotic entry into globalization, made up largely of humiliation, the dictates of negations which often reach the identity of individuals and groups. Without a powerful work of these three levels, an effective democratic model can actually be illusive. But will this work? We now know how the'autocratie modernizing "is fictitious, totally unfit to perform such a dynamic, rather, have done all the autocrats in the Arab world more than confuse these three strata upon which the future success democracy.
That's what makes it so difficult dilemma that the situation in these countries. The only path of hope lies in the path followed by emerging powers, Turkey, Brazil, India, which have gradually succeeded in building a democracy through their economic performance due to the birth of a true middle class that is recognized in the virtues of such a regime, and finally thanks to recognition from the outside of their strength and their respectability.
In this work, the West is very bad start. It is within, not from within the Arab world, was invented the concept of fatal "modernizing autocracy." The idea, if the plan was simple and was already found in the developmentalist ideology of the 1960s: the establishment of authoritarian regimes was deemed necessary to ensure the development and the forthcoming accession of these companies in paradise Democracy and consumption.
The recipe was actually an advantage for tutors West: that of their offer on a plateau the princes dependent manna West and thus become ideal customers for the diplomacy of great powers. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the events of Sept. 11, an additional wager made its appearance: the authoritarian regimes were more functional than they offered additional guarantees of security that became the obsession of the great powers.
The calculation was absurd, because it was mechanically the bed of religious radicalism and social movements confided to the exclusive role of dispute. We have seen to what extremes such dire choices have been taken. Aggravating circumstance: most Western diplomats have shown an incredible myopia, preferring to watch the routine dictators become partners rather than corporations, their evolution and transformation.
So, the first stirrings social were met with skepticism, and we preferred to provide law enforcement cooperation, to sentence with words of wisdom, rather than taking into account these new dynamics. Perhaps the United States here have shown more insight, Barack Obama doing anyway in cases of Tunisia and Egypt, that follow the grammar of his first speeches.
Arab diplomacy of France was already eroded recently. The cut is perhaps not 2007, but is around 2004, 2005 and the end of the second term of Jacques Chirac. We have seen gradually disappearing resources and guidance that distinguished France, in the Arab world, its Western partners. The pathetic interlude of the Union for the Mediterranean has not revived the Arab policy, she dissolved into a whole informed.
Today, we live in a third stage: more diplomacy Arab, more recognition of a world that has its own personality, but also a cold ignorance of social realities, yet so rich and complex, which at the same time the instability and the future of the Arab world. 
We were able to find hints with Maoism when the Cultural Revolution. It is found with the Khmer Rouge as installed in the second half of 1970. Maybe the totalitarianism he still corresponds to what is observed in North Korea. But even during the most severe of these various schemes are known to remain discreet and clandestine methods of individual autonomy that made that totalitarianism, fortunately, did not accomplished in his entire project.
Today, with globalization, the rise of communications technology, with the diversification of identifications and allegiances, totalitarianism is a political project increasingly less able to achieve. Moreover, few companies, particularly in the south, have the technical capabilities to sustain.
He should speak rather of authoritarianism, autocracy, and more exactly, to designate and regimes that are not freely chosen and which are constructed by restricting freedoms, restricting or denying the rights, and allowing the less autonomy possible civil societies. Precisely because of this project today is increasingly difficult to realize that we saw everywhere, and especially in these autocracies of the Arab world that are Tunisia Ben Ali of Egypt Mubarak and Gaddafi's Libya, a movement of emancipation from the company and its capabilities constantly strengthened empowerment.
The "protest zero" is not, fortunately, in all cases needed less and less. Even the harshest authoritarian regimes are forced to leak elements of dispute that can take unexpected forms, such as derision, misrepresentation, or happen in books other than those of classical politics, including through the directories religious.
Obviously, the optimum efficiency of authoritarian practice is to leave one part of a dispute to avoid risk of explosion. China is clearly entering a post-totalitarian moment. In any case, and most experts refer to the period starting after the Cultural Revolution, and in all cases, when the opening-up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
The choice that the post-Mao leaders have done for their country was that of entry into globalization. This meant to overcome the Maoist vision of a confrontation between China and global capitalism. Which also meant to integrate Chinese society and economic practices formerly vilified and denunciation which is built the totalitarian overtones of Maoist ideology.
Therefore, this change of path analysis and withdrew to China this ideology it needed to maintain a totalitarian order. Outright repression, the type of Tiananmen in June 1989, thus substituting for large buildings and previous switch was the Middle Kingdom in order autocratic trite, but now post-totalitarian.
Add to this that it is difficult to have your cake and eat it: the entry into globalization and maintaining order unanimist as the one who entrusted the Great Helmsman's conduct of his people. So basically in a volatile atmosphere, and which will increasingly, as China discovered empirically the benefits and dangers of post-totalitarianism.
Iran is a different case, since the ideology is an essential guard around Islam and an ideological reading of it. Add to this a range of symptoms that may support the idea of contention totalitarian control of consumption, dress, recreation, etc.. Yet here we are also out of pure totalitarian logic as we have defined.
First, because the Islamic Republic does not have the technical means for effective control and total company: it remains in Iran led by a series of autonomous dynamics that allow civil society to sustain and the challenge to express themselves through various channels. Moreover, the internationalization of fact of all societies prevents Iranian society to live outside the world and patterns of globalization.
We therefore speak of "religious autocracy" much more than a "religious totalitarianism." That is the problem. If today the Libyan autocracy is sinking, is largely because the centrifugal forces are deep and effective. It is therefore surprising that the revolution we see today can build a substitute regime collapses, one that would be just as central and could be likened to forms of state or democracy known in the West .
More profoundly, it is necessary to observe a major trend: the revolutions that have developed in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, but also being in Bahrain and Yemen, are above all social revolutions that mark the revenge of the companies much more than an opposition became non-existent or marginal.
We came suddenly in the post-Leninist, where protests are effective when they are not, to animate an organization, a leader, an ideology, a program. This post-Leninist logic fits well with globalization as we know it today, with the evolution of communications technology, with demographic changes, with conventional regression models ideological.
She invents a different political dynamic where the order is not prebuilt, but in a situation to build and evolve over the events. We can therefore expect, after a moment of strong centralization and idealization, a reinvention of another policy that will make it much more difficult the formation of a government model ordered.
That for better or for worse: the lack of organization and such post-Leninist revolutions may as well make the bed of a néobonapartisme, picking up any general power to take that promote invention new forms of participation, and perhaps eventually, new practices of democratic power. Do not forget, in fact, that those in power in Cairo and Tunis, perhaps tomorrow or in Tripoli in Manama, are and will be supervised by social actors, and even whole societies: their chance of retaining power will perhaps based on their abilities to listen to a society of which they now know it will never be silent.
It was stupidly bet on the silence of some companies, their indifference to democracy, the disorder of the elusive "Arab street": impressions of a racist nature are now forever denied. This is of course one of the unknowns. But we must be careful because too much has been simplified this aspect of reality is much more complex.
First, the army was not in power in Tunisia. There was a reign of police, and especially a policeman who had monopolized power. It does not say that the Tunisian army, which has undoubtedly contributed to the departure of Ben Ali, will be rewarded when it took power, or even that it seeks such an award.
In Egypt, however, the army was actually in power, and that since the coup of the Free Officers in 1952. She somehow defensible feeling at risk with power and corrupted spent as the Mubarak exercised, it has obviously sought to cut the dead branches. Is it so far today united as fifty years ago? It is here that we must be careful: I accept this way of speaking ill of the military in the singular, as could probably do it once.
Today in the army, have diversified interests, personalities have separated, ideologies were simultaneously eroded and broken. Arab nationalism in Nasser's version was a strong cement that gave meaning to the singular time of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Today, under the effect of erosion of pan-Arabism, but also because of globalization of which we spoke earlier, the army has lost the unity that once allowed to confuse in the same militant autocracy.
If we are to understand the future of Egypt, it would be much more appropriate to engage in a sociology of its divisions and its differentiations, without forgetting that one of its leaders may one day, on behalf charisma or simply skill, pick up power to his advantage. But it is hard to admit it will be a new Nasser, probably because, for the reasons stated above, the era of big mobilizations unanimist is probably outdated.
The Maghreb has never been a homogeneous space, and today less than ever. We easily assimilated than the case of Algeria from Tunisia. Now Algeria's just emerged from a long and costly civil war. In addition, she did not know the same freedoms that choking, Tunisia, was explosive and fatal to the despot.
No one can predict in the medium term, the evolution of social processes, but I do not think that Algeria is exposed to the same extent as its eastern neighbor, nor to that of countries like Yemen and Bahrain . Unlike in Tunisia, Algeria is truly power in confiscated by the army. Dispossession overall it is much less obvious to realize that the ouster of a dictator like Ben Ali.
From this point of view at least, it is closer to the case of Egypt and the ability of the Algerian army to Egypt as its big sister the work of regulation necessary to ensure its sustainability. In Morocco, the regulatory capacity is still owned by the monarchy, few challenged by social movements that develop there now.
Except acceleration of history, it seems unlikely that this screen gives legitimacy so easily. If one observes what is happening now, Syria appears to be one of the least affected in the Greater Middle East by the upheavals we have characterized. Several factors are taken into account. First, the Syrian regime has managed to preserve a minimum of national unity around a foreign policy that is very challenged and, unlike what happened in Egypt, ensures the sustainability of a minimum of national cohesion.
We see how Mubarak and his system took enormous risks by dismantling the Egyptian foreign policy and aligning it so cynical about the United States, and even the most radical governments of Israel. If the movement of Tahrir Square expressed no violence against Israel, the theme of solidarity with Palestine was everywhere and was an essential marker of the desire of young Egyptians out a humiliation to which had placed their country's diplomacy.
In addition, the regime of President Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar has no symptoms of corruption as shocking as those that accompany the family sagas Mubarak or Ben Ali's family. It seems to me that the Syrian regime is not in immediate danger, as most of its counterparts in the region.
The issue is complex and cumbersome, since you should first define what is meant by "real democracy". One thing is certain: the Western democratic model, which is that of representative government, is a story that is reducible neither to the long history of the Arab world, nor the data from its current situation.
Three fields must be thoroughly explored to characterize the future of this democracy. First, that of civil societies, still faintly identified, marked by fragile social contracts, and with autonomy still uncertain. Then, the institutions often artificial, clad, poorly understood and little valued by the population.
Finally, that of a chaotic entry into globalization, made up largely of humiliation, the dictates of negations which often reach the identity of individuals and groups. Without a powerful work of these three levels, an effective democratic model can actually be illusive. But will this work? We now know how the'autocratie modernizing "is fictitious, totally unfit to perform such a dynamic, rather, have done all the autocrats in the Arab world more than confuse these three strata upon which the future success democracy.
That's what makes it so difficult dilemma that the situation in these countries. The only path of hope lies in the path followed by emerging powers, Turkey, Brazil, India, which have gradually succeeded in building a democracy through their economic performance due to the birth of a true middle class that is recognized in the virtues of such a regime, and finally thanks to recognition from the outside of their strength and their respectability.
In this work, the West is very bad start. It is within, not from within the Arab world, was invented the concept of fatal "modernizing autocracy." The idea, if the plan was simple and was already found in the developmentalist ideology of the 1960s: the establishment of authoritarian regimes was deemed necessary to ensure the development and the forthcoming accession of these companies in paradise Democracy and consumption.
The recipe was actually an advantage for tutors West: that of their offer on a plateau the princes dependent manna West and thus become ideal customers for the diplomacy of great powers. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the events of Sept. 11, an additional wager made its appearance: the authoritarian regimes were more functional than they offered additional guarantees of security that became the obsession of the great powers.
The calculation was absurd, because it was mechanically the bed of religious radicalism and social movements confided to the exclusive role of dispute. We have seen to what extremes such dire choices have been taken. Aggravating circumstance: most Western diplomats have shown an incredible myopia, preferring to watch the routine dictators become partners rather than corporations, their evolution and transformation.
So, the first stirrings social were met with skepticism, and we preferred to provide law enforcement cooperation, to sentence with words of wisdom, rather than taking into account these new dynamics. Perhaps the United States here have shown more insight, Barack Obama doing anyway in cases of Tunisia and Egypt, that follow the grammar of his first speeches.
Arab diplomacy of France was already eroded recently. The cut is perhaps not 2007, but is around 2004, 2005 and the end of the second term of Jacques Chirac. We have seen gradually disappearing resources and guidance that distinguished France, in the Arab world, its Western partners. The pathetic interlude of the Union for the Mediterranean has not revived the Arab policy, she dissolved into a whole informed.
Today, we live in a third stage: more diplomacy Arab, more recognition of a world that has its own personality, but also a cold ignorance of social realities, yet so rich and complex, which at the same time the instability and the future of the Arab world.
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